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Abstract
We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander
(1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license
innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing oc-
curs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the
subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their do-
mestic firms in order to raise their bargaining position in the joint venture.
This holds true regardless of whether governments offer either uncondi-
tional or conditional subsidies. This suggests an alternative explanation of
the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies.
JEL Classifications: L13, O34
Keywords: patent licensing, industrial organization, R&D subsidies, research
joint ventures, technology policy.
1 introduction
In a seminal paper Spencer and Brander (1983) analyze international R&D
rivalry and show that nation states have an incentive to subsidize R&D ex-
penditures of their home based export industries to give them a strategic
advantage in the subsequent export market game. In equilibrium all nations
engage in such activities, which makes the attempts to gain an advantage
self–defeating. Governments are thus caught in a dilemma: as they all pay
subsidies, their welfare is reduced; yet, for each single nation the alternative
of no subsidization reduces welfare even more.
Spencer and Brander (1983) propose their model as an explanation of the
observed proliferation of R&D subsidies. And they suggest that this justifi-
cation becomes increasingly relevant as international agreements ban export
subsidies that, in the past, served a similar purpose.1
This explanation of R&D subsidies is similar in spirit to a number of con-
tributions that explain the strategic benefit of commitment in an oligopoly
context. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that the owner of
an oligopolistic firm can effectively mimic a Stackelberg leader by delegating
decisions to a manager who is rewarded for aggressive behavior, for example
by appropriately rewarding a combination of sales and profits. Yet, in equi-
librium, all owners of firms make use of that device; hence, in equilibrium,
strategic delegation to managers is self-defeating.
The present paper revisits the Spencer and Brander (1983) analysis. The
motivation for our analysis is the observation that in a Cournot–market game
firms have an incentive to license their innovations to competitors2 and to
pool their R&D investments.
We introduce the possibility of pooling R&D investments and licensing inno-
vations into the Spencer and Brander analysis. This drastically changes the
equilibrium outcome. In particular, R&D subsidies no longer grant a strate-
gic advantage in the Cournot–market game, since optimal licensing gives
rise to equal marginal costs to all firms, regardless of which firm is subsi-
dized by its government. Nevertheless, governments still tend to subsidize
their domestic firms to give them an advantage in the bargaining game that
determines how the costs and benefits of the innovation are shared. These
subsidies play an entirely different role. Therefore, our analysis suggests an
alternative justification of observed R&D subsidies.
The present paper considers both unconditional and conditional subsidies.
Under unconditional subsidies, in equilibrium firms form an RJV and gov-
ernments offer subsidies that are lower than the equilibrium subsidies in
the Spencer and Brander (1983) model. Remarkably, our main finding holds
1See also Brander and Spencer (1983) and Brander (1995).
2Generally, the literature has observed that an “outside” patent holder, who is not also
a user of that innovation, should auction a limited number of licenses (see Kamien, 1992),
whereas an “insider” should use royalty contracts (see Wang, 1998).
1
even if governments are able to commit to a menu of subsidies that are con-
ditional on forming resp. not forming an RJV. In that case, in equilibrium
governments offer subsidies only conditional on not forming an RJV. How-
ever, this does not reestablish the Brander and Spencer (1983) result, since
in equilibrium firms still form an RJV and thus forgo to collect the subsidies
offered to them. Nevertheless, governments are driven to offer subsidies
in order to raise their domestic firm’s default payoff, which increases their
share of the surplus of the RJV.
There is a large literature on international R&D rivalry and R&D subsidies,
and on research joint ventures (RJVs) and licensing. For example, Cheng
(1987) considers a dynamic version of the Spencer and Brander (1983) model
with R&D spillovers which reinforces their results. Bagwell and Staiger (1994)
extend the Spencer and Brander (1983) model to include R&D uncertainty.
They show that governments tend to subsidize their domestic firms’ R&D
activities regardless of whether there is either Bertrand or Cournot compe-
tition. And Qiu and Tao (1998) show that R&D cooperation tends to further
increase the governments’ incentive to subsidize their national firms’ R&D
investments.
Research joint ventures have become increasingly popular ever since the
National Corporation Research Act was passed in the U.S. in 1984, and simi-
lar legislation was passed in the European Union in 1985, taking exemption
from Article 85 for certain R&D arrangements. Numerous research papers
have analyzed various kinds of RJVs, ranging from R&D cooperation, where
firms only coordinate their R&D investments, to RJV cartelization, where
firms coordinate or even jointly conduct their R&D activities and share in-
novations but remain competitors in the product market (see D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988, Kamien, Muller, and Zang, 1992, Miyagiwa and Ohno,
2002).
Like the literature on RJV cartelization we assume that firms jointly conduct
their R&D activities and then share the innovation of the RJV. However, we
go one step further and assume that firms write an optimal RJV contract
that includes royalty licensing of the innovation to member firms. By using
optimal royalty rates firms can prevent the increased competition that would
occur if innovations were simply passed on for free to the members of the
RJV. This use of royalty licensing as part of the optimal RJV contract is an
essential ingredient of our analysis.
We also mention that firms not only have an incentive to cooperate in R&D
and license their innovation to competitors; they are often given additional
incentives to do so. Evidence shows that subsidizing cooperative R&Dprojects
has become an important tool of industrial policy. For example, the Euro-
pean Community provides subsidies to foster R&D cooperation using a va-
riety of instruments such as the European Research Coordination Agency
(EUREKA), the European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technol-
ogy (ESPRIT), the Base Research in Industrial Technology for Europe (BRITE),
and R&D in Advanced Communication Technologies in Europe (RACE). Some
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of these programs, e.g., EUREKA, are financed by each firm’s home gov-
ernment. Moreover, programs such as ESPRIT and RACE require a result–
sharing agreement between the cooperating firms (see Socorro, 2006, Föl-
ster, 1995).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
explains why and how we model the pooling of R&D investments combined
with the licensing of the innovation. Section 4 solves the game without RJV
and licensing, which serves as our benchmark model. Section 5 solves the
subgame–perfect equilibrium of the full game with RJV, licensing, assuming
unconditional subsidies, and compares it with that of the benchmark model.
Section 6 extends the analysis to the case of a menu of conditional subsidies.
Section 7 concludes.
2 the model
We employ the model of R&D rivalry introduced by Spencer and Brander
(1983) as our base model. In that base model two firms, one in each of two
countries, serve the same export market in a third country. The export mar-
ket is a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly under complete information.
Before choosing their outputs firms engage in cost-reducing R&D, the results
of which become common knowledge. And before they play the R&D and
subsequent Cournot–market games, national governments may offer an in-
put based R&D subsidy with the intention of giving their own national firm
a competitive advantage.
We extend that base model by allowing firms to pool their R&D investments
and set up an R&D joint venture (RJV) combined with licensing the innova-
tion to its members. That RJV is taken to be an independent entity, co-owned
by firms, that exclusively conducts R&D and makes its innovation available
to member firms in exchange for royalty payments.
This is done in the framework of the following sequential stage game:
Stage 1 Governments simultaneously choose the R&D subsidy rates, si, per
unit of R&D investment, xi. Their choice becomes public information.
Stage 2 Firms choose whether to form an RJV. If both firms agree to form
an RJV, they negotiate the terms of the joint ownership cum licensing
contract and the RJV’s R&D investment. If they do not agree, they go
alone and simultaneously choose the R&D investments (the detailed
assumption is spelled out in section 3).
Stage 3 Firms observe the R&D investment(s) and terms of the licensing
contract and play a Cournot–market game.
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Firms maximize profits and governments maximize welfare which, in the
present framework, is the difference between their domestic firm’s profit
and the subsidy paid to that firm.
We denote outputs by q := (q1, q2), aggregate output byQ := q1+q2, the in-
verse market demand function by P(Q), firms’ constant unit cost before the
innovation by c, firms’ R&D investment by x := (x1, x2), the R&D production
function by f(xi), and subsidy rates by s := (s1, s2).
Inverse demand is twice continuously differentiable with P ′(Q) < 0 and
∂
(
P ′(Q)qi
)
/∂qj < 0, i, j = 1,2. The latter assures that the q’s are strategic
substitutes and also that firms’ profits are strictly concave functions of their
own output.
The R&D production function f(xi) indicates the cost reduction caused by
an investment xi. It is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with
f ′(xi) > 0, f
′′(xi) < 0 everywhere and f(xi) ≤ c. Finally, the initial unit
cost is such that both firms serve the market if they do not innovate, i.e.,
0 ≤ c < P(0).
To illustrate the analysis we also compute an example that employs func-
tional forms frequently used in the related literature (see, for example, Qiu
and Tao, 1998, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). There, P(Q) := a −
Q,Q := q1 + q2, and f(xi) := min{√xi/γ, c}, where γ is an efficiency para-
meter (a higher γ indicates lower R&D efficiency).3
We rule out “drastic” innovations, i.e., we assume that the innovation sub-
game does not have an equilibrium that implements monopoly. In our de-
tailed example we show exactly how this constrains the choice of the func-
tion f .
3 research joint venture cum licensing
We characterize the RJV by a contract (xL, rL, t1, t2) that stipulates the level
of the joint R&D investment, xL, the royalty rate, rL, and the transfers to its
members, (t1, t2). In principle, such a contract can take many forms. How-
ever, in order to maximize the gains from the joint venture, the following
properties must be satisfied:
1. The R&D investment of the RJV, xL, should maximize the sum total of
firms’ net profits.
2. The license fee should be based on a royalty rate per output unit, rL,
that is equal to the cost reduction due to the innovation, i.e., rL =
f(xL); as a result, the effective unit cost is made equal to the unit cost
before the innovation, c − f(xL)+ rL = c.
3The full documentation of the example plus a supplementary Mathematica file are
available for download at http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wt1/papers/
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3. The transfers to the member firms should solve the Nash bargaining
game between the members of the RJV subject to budget and partici-
pation constraints (see the exact statement in (13) to (15)).
The choice of royalty rate is rationalized as follows. If firms pay no royal-
ties their unit costs are reduced by the innovation which gives rise to more
aggressive behavior in the Cournot–market game and hence to a mutual
destruction of profits. This can only be prevented by arranging royalty li-
censing with a royalty rate rL equal to the cost reduction caused by the
innovation, i.e., rL = f(xL). This way, the effective unit cost, i.e. the unit
cost after the innovation plus royalty rate, is equal to the unit cost before the
innovation. This completely neutralizes the undesirable competition effect
of the innovation.4
If the RJV were free to set any royalty rate, it would obviously set a royalty
rate — e.g. r = (1− c+f(xL))/4 — that effectively raises the marginal cost
of its member firms and implement the monopoly solution. It is reasonable
to assume that the competition authority does not allow the RJV to raise the
marginal cost of its member firms above the level prior to the innovation.
Therefore, the best the RJV can do is to set the royalty rate equal to the cost
reduction that is due to its innovation.
We mention that setting the royalty rate equal to the cost reduction can
be optimal even if there are more than two firms, and not all of them join
the RJV. In order to see this, one must analyze an asymmetric oligopoly
with n > 2 firms, among which k ≤ n join the RJV and set up a royalty
scheme with royalty rate r ≤ f(xL). If one computes the smallest k for
which r = f(xL) is optimal, one finds that it is generally less than n. Using
our example and setting c = 0.25, f(xL) = 0.05, n ∈ {5,10}, it turns out
that r = f(xL) is optimal if at least 70% of all firms join the RJV.5
4 the benchmark case without rjv
In this section, we briefly review the game without RJVs and licensing, which
serves as a benchmark. This game corresponds to the model by Spencer and
Brander (1983).
The subgame–perfect equilibrium of that game consists of the equilibrium
strategies σ := (qN(x),xN(s), sN) and the payoff functions of the Cournot,
R&D investment, and subsidy subgames:
Πi(q,xi, si) : = (P(Q)− c + f(xi)) qi − (1− si)xi (1)
ΠNi (x, si) : = Πi(qN(x),xi, si) (2)
GNi (s) : = ΠN
∗
i (s)− sixNi (s), (3)
4We mention that royalty licensing is quite commonly used in industry (see Rostoker,
1984, Anand and Khanna, 2000).
5This is similar to the well-known result that at least 80% of all firms have to merge in
order to make a merger profitable (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983).
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where
ΠN
∗
i (s) := ΠNi (xN(s), si). (4)
The equilibrium strategies σ satisfy the following conditions for all i = 1,2:
∂Πi
∂qi
∣∣∣∣∣
q=qN(x)
≤ 0 and qNi (x)
∂Πi
∂qi
∣∣∣∣∣
q=qN(x)
= 0 ∀x, s (5)
∂ΠNi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xN(s)
≤ 0 and xNi (s)
∂ΠNi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xN(s)
= 0 ∀s (6)
∂GNi
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
≤ 0 and sNi
∂GNi
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0, (7)
provided the second–order conditions are satisfied.6
If drastic innovations are excluded, the game may have a symmetric equi-
librium in which both firms choose the same equilibrium outputs and the
same R&D investments, and governments choose the same subsidy rates. If
such an equilibrium exists, one has:
Proposition 1 (Spencer and Brander 1983) If the benchmark game has a
symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium subsidy rates are
sN1 = sN2 =
∂ΠN
∗
i (s)
∂xj
∂xNj (s)
∂si
∂xNi (s)
∂si
=: sN. (8)
In our downloadable example we state necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with and without subsidies,
and for drastic and non-drastic innovations.
5 solution of the game with unconditional subsidies
We now characterize the joint–venture and subsequent Cournot subgames
for arbitrarily given nonnegative subsidy rates s. These subsidies are made
independent of whether firms join an RJV.
As we already pointed out, the joint venture contract {rL, xL, t1, t2} pre-
scribes royalty licensing with the royalty rate rL = f(xL) and fixed transfers
from the RJV to firms, t := (t1, t2). An immediate implication is that in
the subsequent Cournot subgame the effective unit cost of member firms is
equal to the pre–innovation unit cost c. Member firms thus maximize their
6The assumptions concerning P assure concavity ofΠi(q,xi, si) in qi. However, suitable
concavity properties of ΠNi (x, si) and G
N
i (s) in xi resp. si must also be satisfied.
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operating profit plus transfer payment, πi(q) + ti, by choosing their own
output qi, where the operating profit πi is a function of q as follows:
πi(q) : = (P(Q)− c + f(xL)− r)qi
= (P(Q)− c)qi.
(9)
Obviously, the maximizer of πi(q)+ ti equals that of πi(q). Therefore,
Proposition 2 (Cournot Subgames) The equilibrium strategies of the Cournot
subgames, qL(x), are
qLi (x) =
⎧⎨
⎩q
N
i (0) if the RJV was formed,
qNi (x) otherwise,
(10)
where qN1 (0) = qN2 (0) = qN0 is the symmetric equilibrium output in the bench-
mark case for x = 0 (see (5)). And the associated equilibrium operating profit
if an RJV is formed is
πL := π(qN0 , qN0 ). (11)
Using this result, the other elements of the equilibriumRJV contract {t(s), x∗L (s)}
have to maximize the total surplus of the firms that form the RJV,
max
xL
Φ(xL, s) := 2πL + 2f(xL)qN0 − (1− s1 − s2)xL, (12)
(where πL and qN0 are independent of xL), and solve the following Nash
bargaining problem (subject to budget (14) and participation constraints
(15)):
max
t1,t2
(
πL + t1 −ΠN∗1 (s)
)(
πL + t2 −ΠN∗2 (s)
)
(13)
s.t. t1 + t2 = 2f
(
x∗L (s)
)
qN0 − x∗L (s) (1− s1 − s2) (14)
πL + ti ≥ ΠN∗i (s), i = 1,2 (15)
where
(
ΠN
∗
1 (s),Π
N∗
2 (s)
)
represents the disagreement point.
Proposition 3 (Joint Venture Subgame) In equilibrium the RJV is formed
and given s, the equilibrium RJV contract, {rL(s), x∗L (s), t(s)}, is character-
ized as follows (for i, j = 1,2, i ≠ j):
rL(s) = f(x∗L (s)) (16)
f ′(x∗L (s))2q
N
0 = 1− s1 − s2 (17)
ΠLi (s) := πL + ti(s) =
1
2
(
ΦL(s)+ΠN∗i (s)−ΠN
∗
j (s)
)
(18)
ΦL(s) := Φ(x∗L (s), s). (19)
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Proof: We already showed that (16) is the optimal royalty rate. (17) is the
first–order condition of (12); therefore, (17) characterizes the optimal R&D
investment of the RJV, x∗L (s) . It remains to be shown that the RJV is formed
and that equilibrium transfers are characterized by (18), (19). This is shown,
in two steps, as follows: We solve the restricted Nash bargaining problem
that ignores the two participation constraints (15), and then show that the
solution of the restricted bargaining problem actually satisfies the omitted
constraints.
Substituting the budget constraint (14) into the Nash product (13), the re-
stricted Nash bargaining problem simplifies to the maximization of
max
t1
(
πL + t1 −ΠN∗1 (s)
)(
ΦL(s)−πL − t1 −ΠN∗2 (s)
)
. (20)
Computing the first–order condition, one obtains the two equilibrium trans-
fers and thus the total payoffs of the two member firms as stated in (18),
(19).
Next, computing the difference ΠLi (s) − ΠN
∗
i (s), for i, j = 1,2, i ≠ j, one
finds, by the fact that ΦL(s) is the maximum sum of profits,
ΠLi (s)−ΠN
∗
i (s) =
1
2
(
ΦL(s)−
(
ΠN
∗
i (s)+ΠN
∗
j (s)
))
≥ 0. (21)
This confirms that the participation constraints omitted in the restricted
Nash bargaining problem are not binding and the RJV is formed. 
Finally, we use the equilibrium of the RJV subgames to solve the subsidy
game played between national governmentswhose payoff function isGLi (s) =
ΠLi (s)− six∗L (s).
The first–order conditions of government i are: ∂GLi (s)/∂si ≤ 0, si∂GLi (s)/∂si =
0. By the envelope theorem one has ∂ΦL(s)/∂si = x∗L (s). Therefore,
∂GLi (s)
∂si
= 1
2
(
∂ΦL(s)
∂si
− 2x∗L (s)− 2si
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
)
+ 1
2
B(s)
= 1
2
(
B(s)− x∗L (s)− 2si
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
) (22)
B(s) := ∂Π
N∗
1 (s)
∂si
− ∂Π
N∗
2 (s)
∂si
, (23)
where B(s), will be referred to as “bargaining effect.”
Proposition 4 Suppose the functions GLi (s) are concave in si. Then, the
introduction of RJVs and licensing does not eliminate the incentive to subsidize
R&D investments. However, compared to the benchmark game it gives rise
to lower equilibrium subsidy rates.
8
Proof: First, we show that, because of the bargaining effect, the govern-
ments have incentives to subsidize R&D investment. Obviously, the bargain-
ing effect, B(s), is positive since a higher si not only boosts the profit of firm
i but also lowers the profit of the rival firm and both effects raise firm i’s
share in the surplus generated by the RJV. If there were no bargaining ef-
fect, the governments would not subsidize the RJV because the innovation
developed by the RJV has the feature of a public good, and therefore each
government tends to free ride. However, to gain a larger share of the total
surplus of the RJV, the governments still have incentives to subsidize if the
RJV’s R&D investment is not very large.
To prove the second part of Proposition 4, we evaluate the partial derivatives
∂GLi (s)/∂si at the point s = (sN, sN) and show that they are negative. Since
these derivatives are monotonically decreasing (by the assumed concavity),
the equilibrium subsidy rate sL must be lower than sN .
Notice that the term B(s) in the RHS of (22) vanishes since (sN, sN) is an
equilibrium of the game without licensing. By the first–order conditions of
government i in the game without licensing (where sN = (sN, sN)),
∂GN1 (s)
∂s1
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
=
(
∂ΠN
∗
1 (s)
∂s1
− xN1 (s)− sN
∂xNi (s)
∂s1
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0 (24)
∂GN2 (s)
∂s2
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
=
(
∂ΠN
∗
2 (s)
∂s2
− xN2 (s)− sN
∂xN2 (s)
∂s2
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0. (25)
Of course, s = sN implies xN1 (s) = xN2 (s). By (24)–(25), ∂ΠN
∗
1 (s)/∂s1 =
∂ΠN
∗
2 (s)/∂s2.
Therefore, one obtains
∂GLi (s)
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= − 1
2
(
x∗L (s)+ 2sN
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
< 0, (26)
as asserted. 
We illustrate the results with our example in Table 1. It states the symmet-
ric equilibrium outcomes, the subsidy rates and the R&D investments and
profits, for different values of the efficiency parameter γ for the games with
and without licensing.7
It shows that all these variables, exceptΠN
∗
i , are monotonically increasing in
R&D efficiency (measured by a decreasing γ). Only ΠN
∗
i is decreasing in R&D
efficiency, which is due to the fact that, in the absence of RJVs and licensing,
the higher subsidy rates induced by increased R&D efficiency make firms
compete more vigorously in the export market, as we know already from
Spencer and Brander (1983). Moreover, it shows how the introduction of
RJVs and licensing lowers the equilibrium subsidy rate for each given γ.
7Note, efficiency of R&D investment is decreasing in γ.
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R&D efficiency parameter γ
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 3 17
sN .119 .075 .053 .040 .031 .025 .021 .018 .013 .000
sL .107 .063 .039 .025 .016 .009 .004 .000 .000 .000
xN .065 .038 .026 .019 .015 .012 .010 .008 .006 ≈ 0
xL .125 .074 .051 .038 .030 .024 .020 .016 .012 ≈ 0
ΠN
∗
i .106 .109 .110 .110 .111 .111 .111 .111 .111 .111
ΠLi .160 .144 .135 .129 .125 .123 .121 .119 .117 .111
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes with and without licensing
The subsidy rates sL are positive if γ ∈ (1,2.62), and reach zero for all
γ ≥ 2.62, while sN is positive and approaches zero only as γ approaches 17
(from below).
We conclude that subsidies are also a feature of the model with RJVs and
licensing. However, they serve an entirely different purpose than in the
Spencer and Brander (1983) model. When RJVs and licensing are feasible,
firms no longer use R&D investments to gain a strategic advantage in the
Cournot–market game. And therefore, governments can no longer use sub-
sidies to enhance their domestic firms’ share in the export market. The only
purpose of subsidies is to improve the position of their domestic firm in
the bargaining over the division of the RJV’s profit. The level of equilibrium
subsidies depends upon the productivity of R&D investment, as we show in
the downloadable documentation of the example.
6 extension to conditional subsidies
So far we have assumed that governments offer subsidies independent of
whether their domestic firms stay alone or form an RJV. We now explore
what happens if governments are able to offer conditional subsidies. In
order to allow for all possible contingent subsidies, we assume that each
government offers a menu of subsidies:
{sr1 , sn1 }, resp. {sr2 , sn2 }, (27)
where sri is paid if and only if firms form an RJV, and s
n
i if and only if firm
i stays alone.
If sri = sni , the subsidy scheme is equivalent to an unconditional subsidy
(analyzed in the previous section). If sri = 0, sni > 0 a subsidy is paid only
if no RJV is formed, and if sri > 0, s
n
i = 0 a subsidy is paid only if the RJV
is formed. Therefore, the assumed menu of subsidies includes all possible
subsidy schemes as a special case.
For convenience of notation let s := (sr , sn) with sr := (sr1 , sr2 ) and sn :=
(sn1 , s
n
2 ). Note that Φ is only a function of sr and firms’ default payoffs are
10
only a function of sn. Therefore,
ΠLi (s) :=
1
2
(
ΦL(sr )+ΠN∗i (sn)−ΠN
∗
j (s
n)
)
(28)
ΦL(sr ) := Φ(x∗L (sr ), sr ) (29)
GLi (s) = ΠLi (s)− sri x∗L (sr ). (30)
Proposition 5 Suppose conditional subsidies are feasible. In equilibrium
sr = (0,0), i.e. subsidies conditional on forming an RJV are not offered.
Hence, unconditional subsidies are not part of the equilibrium.
Proof: A subsidy that is conditional on forming an RJV matters only when
the RJV forms. Therefore, the equilibrium subsidies (sr1 , s
r
2 ) must be max-
imizers of governments’ payoffs GL, and one obtains, using the envelope
theorem and the fact that x∗L (sr ) is increasing in s
r
i :
∂GLi (s)
∂sri
=− 1
2
(
x∗L (s
r )+ 2sri
∂x∗L (sr )
∂sri
)
< 0. (31)
Therefore, in equilibrium one has sr = (0,0).
Since unconditional subsidies are the special case where sni = sri > 0, it
follows immediately that unconditional subsidies are not an equilibrium.

This result reflects the fact that the RJV’s R&D is a public good; therefore,
each government wishes to free ride on the subsidy provided by the other
government.
In the following we pay no more attention to sr and characterize the equi-
librium strategies sn.
If both governments only offer subsidies conditional on not forming an
RJV, one may conjecture that the Spencer and Brander (1983) equilibrium in
which both governments subsidize at the same rate and both firms compete
in R&D investment will be restored. However, this is not the case.
Proposition 6 Setting sn = sN and not forming an RJV is not part of the
equilibrium.
Proof: If the assertion were not true, one would have sn = sN and the
RJV were not formed. The latter implies ΠN
∗
i
(
sN
)
> ΠLi
(
sN
) = (ΦL(0,0) +
ΠN
∗
i
(
sN
)−ΠN∗j (sN)) /2 and hence,ΠN∗1 (sN)+ΠN∗2 (sN) > ΦL(0,0).However,
this contradicts the fact that
ΠN
∗
(sn) : = ΠN∗1 (sN)+ΠN
∗
2 (s
N)
< ΠN
∗
1 (0,0)+ΠN
∗
2 (0,0)
< ΦL(0,0).
(32)

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To prepare the characterization of the equilibrium subsidy rates sn, implic-
itly define s˜(sn2 ) as the subsidy rate that solves the equation (where ΠN
∗(sn)
denotes the sum of default payoffs):
ΠN
∗ (
s˜(sn2 ), s
n
2
) = ΦL(0,0). (33)
In other words, s˜(sn2 ) denotes the subsidy rate s
n
1 of government 1 that keeps
firms indifferent between forming and not forming the RJV.
Lemma 1 s˜ has the following properties: 1) s˜ is defined for all sn2 ∈ (0,1), 2)
s˜(sn2 ) > s
n
2 .
Proof: The RJV is formed if and only if ΠN∗(sn) ≤ ΦL(0,0). In order to
prove 1) and 2) we need to show that for each given sn2 there exists a value
of sn1 for which this inequality is satisfied with equality, and that s˜(s
n
2 ) > s
n
2 .
The proof is in three steps.
a) By a known property of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly, the direct effect
of a cost reduction on the own profit is greater in absolute amount than
the indirect effect on the other firm’s profit. Every increase in xi induces a
reduction in unit cost. Since the partial derivative of ΠN1 with respect to x
N
1
is positive and that of ΠN2 is negative, it follows that
∂ΠN1 (xN(sn), s
n
1 )
∂xN1
> −∂Π
N
2 (xN(sn), s
n
2 )
∂xN1
> 0. (34)
Hence, by the envelope theorem together with (34) and zi := (xN(sn), sni )
∂ΠN∗(sn)
∂sn1
= ∂Π
N
1 (z1)
∂xN2
∂xN2 (sn)
∂sn1
+ xN1 (sn)+
∂ΠN2 (z2)
∂xN1
∂xN1 (sn)
∂sn1
>
∂ΠN1 (z1)
∂xN2
∂xN2 (sn)
∂sn1
+ xN1 (sn)−
∂ΠN1 (z1)
∂xN1
∂xN1 (sn)
∂sn1
= ∂Π
N
1 (z1)
∂xN2
∂xN2 (sn)
∂sn1
+ xN1 (sn) > 0.
(35)
This proves that the sum of profits, ΠN∗(sn), is a strictly increasing function
of sn1 .
b) By (32) we know that
ΠN
∗
1
(
sn1 , s
n
2
)+ΠN∗2 (sn1 , sn2 ) < ΦL (0,0) . (36)
Therefore, for sn1 ≤ sn2 , ΠN
∗(sn) < ΦL(0,0).
c) If sn1 is sufficiently high relative to s
n
2 , the profit of firm 1 can be made
arbitrarily high, whereas the profit of firm 2 cannot become negative. Hence,
there exists a sn1 for which ΠN
∗(sn) > ΦL(0,0). While this is obvious if one
allows for s1 > 1, it can also be shown for s1 ≤ 1. A sufficient condition is
spelled out in the Appendix.
Combining a), b), and c) it follows that for each sn2 there is a unique map
s˜(sn2 ) which exhibits s˜(s
n
2 ) > s
n
2 . 
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Proposition 7 Suppose conditional subsidies are feasible, the equilibrium
strategies sn are asymmetric. Government 1 offers the (higher) subsidy rate
sn1 = s˜(sn2 ), and government 2 the (lower) rate sn2 > 0, the RJV is formed, and
no subsidy is paid out.
Proof: We construct a subsidy rate sn2 to which s
n
1 = s˜(sn2 ) is a best reply,
and vice versa.
1) For all sn2 , s
n
1 = s˜(sn2 ), the following holds true: Suppose government 1
unilaterally deviates and offers a lower conditional subsidy rate, s1 < sn1 .
Then, the partnership is maintained and no subsidy is paid (recall, ΠN∗ is
increasing in s1). However, the government’s payoff diminishes since its
domestic firm’s default payoff goes down and that of the rival goes up.
Similarly, one can show that government 2 cannot benefit from unilaterally
lowering its subsidy rate.
2) Now consider “upward” deviations to s1 > sn1 , resp. s2 > s
n
2 . By the
monotonicity of ΠN∗ (see (35)), these deviations destroy the RJV. Therefore,
the deviating government’s payoff jumps down discontinuously due to the
fact that now the promised subsidy has to be paid. For example, if gov-
ernment 2 deviates to s2 > sn2 its payoff jumps from G
L
2(sn) = ΠL2(sn) =
ΠN
∗
2 (s
n
1 , s
n
2 ) (represented by the dashed line in Figure 1) down toG
N
2 (s
n
1 , s2) =
ΠN
∗
2 (s
n
1 , s2) − s2xN2 (sn1 , s2) (represented by the solid curve in Figure 1).8
Therefore, locally, these deviations do not pay. However, to assure that
this extends also to large deviations, we now construct a value of sn2 for
which the discontinuous jumps occur to the nonincreasing part of the GNi
functions.
Figure 1: Payoff of government 2 for s2 ≥ sn2 = 0.6
For this purpose, denote the reaction function of government 2 in the bench-
mark model by R(s1). That function is strict monotone decreasing (see
8This graph is based on the example spelled out in the downloadable documentation of
our example.
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Spencer and Brander, 1983); therefore, for all s1 one has R(s1) ≤ R(0). Now
set (sn2 = R(0), sn1 = s˜(sn2 )). Then, sn2 is not smaller than the maximizer over
s2 of GN2
(
s˜(sn2 ), s2
)
, and hence
∂G2
(
s˜(sn2 ), s2
)
∂s2
≤ 0, ∀s2 ≥ sn2 . (37)
And since sn1 = s˜(sn2 ) > sn2 ≥ R(0), it follows that sn1 is greater than the
maximizer of GN1 and hence
∂G1
(
s1, sn2
)
∂s1
≤ 0, ∀s1 ≥ s˜(sn2 ). (38)
This proves that upward deviations give rise to a downward jump of the
governments’ payoff from GLi (s
n) = ΠN∗i (sn) to the declining part of the
functionGNi (s) = ΠN
∗
i (s)−sixNi (s). Therefore, it does not pay to unilaterally
raise s1 resp. s2. 
The equilibrium that we constructed in the proof of Proposition 7 is not
unique. There are other equilibria for other values of sn2 , each combined
with sn1 = s˜(sn2 ). This multiplicity and the properties of these equilibria are
illustrated in detail in the following Table 2 which is based on our example
for γ = √40/3.
Table 2 summarizes a sample of equilibrium subsidies, associated payoffs,
G∗i ,Π
∗
i , and cost reductions f
∗
i . The first two columns state equilibrium
subsidy rates, column 3 and 4 state the equilibrium cost reduction, and
columns 5 and 6 state the associated equilibrium payoffs of governments
and firms. As s2 is increased, the equilibrium subsidy rate of government 1
goes up, and so does the profit of firm 1.
sn2 s
n
1 = s˜(sn2 ) f∗1 f∗2 G∗1 = Π∗1 G∗2 = Π∗2
0.3 0.813 0.553 0.037 0.221 0.026
0.4 0.816 0.567 0.043 0.222 0.025
0.5 0.819 0.586 0.052 0.223 0.024
0.6 0.824 0.615 0.064 0.225 0.022
0.7 0.831 0.664 0.084 0.228 0.019
0.8 0.842 0.759 0.120 0.234 0.013
Table 2: Sample of equilibrium strategies
(
sn1 , s
n
2
)
, and payoffs
Altogether, we conclude that no matter whether conditional subsidies are
feasible, licensing eliminates the strategic motive of R&D investments, and
subsidies only serve the purpose to raise firms’ share in the surplus gener-
ated by the RJV.
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7 conclusion
The present paper has reconsidered the explanation of R&D subsidies by
Spencer and Brander (1983) and others. We enrich their model by allowing
firms to pool R&D investments and license the innovation of the RJV. This
modification has drastic implications. In equilibrium, firms form an RJV and
write an optimal contract that makes the innovation available to all member
firms in exchange for royalties based on a fixed royalty rate. That rate is set
in such a way that innovations do not change the intensity of competition.
As a result, governments cannot use R&D subsidies to enhance their do-
mestic firms’ market share, and therefore the justification of R&D subsidies
proposed by Spencer and Brander (1983) no longer holds. Nevertheless, gov-
ernments still subsidize R&D investments, but only in order to improve their
domestic firm’s bargaining position in RJV subgame.
Remarkably, our result is independent of whether governments offer un-
conditional subsidies or are able to commit to offer a menu of conditional
subsidies. In this regard, the only difference is that unconditional subsidies
must be paid whereas conditional subsidies are never paid out and therefore
their benefit comes at no cost.
Altogether, one may debate whether governments can commit to conditional
subsidies. However, regardless of whether conditional or unconditional sub-
sidies are more meaningful, the main message remains the same.
appendix: supplement to the proof of lemma 1
Here we supplement part c) of the proof of Lemma 1. Denote the unit cost af-
ter innovation by c1 resp. c2 and write the equilibrium profits of the Cournot
subgame without RJV by ΠNi (c1, c2). Also denote the lowest unit cost that
can be achieved by c, i.e., c := inf{ci ≥ 0 | ci = c − f(xi), xi ≥ 0}.
The following assumption assures that for each given sn2 the sum of equi-
librium profits, ΠN∗(sn) exceeds ΦL(0,0) for some sn1
Assumption 1
ΠN1 (c, c)+ΠN2 (c, c) > ΦL(0,0). (39)
Proof: For s1 = 1 it is optimal for firm 1 to lower the unit cost to the level
c, regardless of the cost reduction chosen by firm 2. Suppose government
1 sets s1 = 1 and denote the best reply of government 2 by s2, and denote
the optimal unit cost of firm 2 by c2. Then, using the assumption and the
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fact that c2 is an optimal unit cost, one obtains:
ΠN
∗
(s1, s2) = ΠN1 (c, c2)+ΠN2 (c, c2)− (1− s2)xN2 (s)
≥ ΠN1 (c, c2)+ΠN2 (c, c) (by definition of a maximum)
≥ ΠN1 (c, c)+ΠN2 (c, c) (by the monotonicity of ΠN1 in c2)
> ΦL(0,0) (by Assumption 1).
It follows that there exists also some s1 < 1 that assures existence of a sn1
that satisfies the inequality ΠN∗(sn) > ΦL(0,0). 
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